

Cryptography In the Bounded Quantum-Storage Model

joint work with Ivan Damgård, Serge Fehr and Louis Salvail
(accepted at FOCS 2005)

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Agenda


- “Known” Results
- Protocol for Oblivious Transfer
- Security Proof
- Bit Commitment
- Practicality Issues
- Open Problems

Classical 2-party primitives: Rabin Oblivious Transfer



- **correct:** For honest Alice and Bob, Bob gets the bit b with probability $1/2$
- **oblivious:** Even if Bob is dishonest, he does not get information about b with probability $1/2$
- **private:** Even if Alice is dishonest, she does not learn, whether Bob received the bit or not.

Classical 2-party primitives: Bit Commitment




- **correct:** BC allows Alice to commit to a bit b .
Later, she can open C_b to Bob.
- **hiding:** Even if Bob is dishonest, he does not get information on b from C_b .
- **binding:** Even if Alice is dishonest, she cannot open C_b to another value than b .

Classical 2-party primitives: Relations

Oblivious Transfer




Bit Commitment




- $OT \Rightarrow BC$, $OT \geq BC$
- OT is complete for two-party cryptography

Known Impossibility Results




- In the classical unconditionally secure model without further assumptions

Classical 2-party primitives: Bit Commitment




- **hiding:** Even if Bob is dishonest, he does not get information on b from C_b .
- **binding:** Even if Alice is dishonest, she cannot open C_b to another value than b .

Known Impossibility Results



- In the classical unconditionally secure model without further assumptions



- In the unconditionally secure model **with quantum communication**
[Mayers97, Lo-Chau97]

Three Ways Out

- ~~OT~~ Bound computing power (schemes based on complexity assumptions)
- ~~EC~~ Noisy communication [e.g. CrépeauMorozovWolf04]
- **Physical limitations**
e.g. bounded memory size

Classical Bounded-Storage Model

- random string which players try to store
- a memory bound applies at a specified moment
- protocol for OT [DHRS, TCC04]:
memory size of honest players: k
memory of dishonest players: $<k^2$
- Tight bound [DM, EC04]
- can be **improved** by allowing **quantum communication**

OT



BC


Quantum Bounded-Storage Model

- quantum memory bound applies at a specified moment
- besides that, players are unbounded (in time and space)
- **unconditional secure** against adversaries with quantum memory of less than **half of the transmitted qubits** (honest players do not need quantum memory at all)

OT



BC




- honest players: 0 k
- dishonest players: $<n/2$ $<k^2$
- **ratio:** ∞ k


Agenda

- ✓ Known Results
- **Protocol for Oblivious Transfer**
- Security Proof
- Bit Commitment
- Practicality Issues
- Open Problems

Quantum Mechanics I



Measurements:




Quantum Oblivious Transfer

Alice $b \in \{0, 1\}$

$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$ 

$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$ 0110...

$|x\rangle_r$



0110...

Bob

$r' \in_R \{+, \times\}$ 

obtains x' by

measuring all qubits

in basis r'



memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

CS1

$h \in_R H_n$

$s = b \oplus h(x)$

r, h, s

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$

Example: honest players

Slide 14

CS1 **h is two-universal and BINARY**
Christian Schaffner; 24.02.2005

Quantum Oblivious Transfer II


Alice

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n \quad 0110\dots$$



$$|x\rangle_r$$



Bob

$$r' \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

obtains x' by

measuring all qubits

in basis r'



0011...

memory bound: store < n/2 qubits

$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$

r, h, s

x gets \perp $h(x' \oplus h(x))$ indep
 b iff $r = r'$

honest players? ✓


private? ✓

Obliviousness against dishonest Bob?

Alice

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n \quad 0110\dots$$



Bob

$r' \in_R \{+, \times\}$
store all qubits!
obtains x' by



--- memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits ---

r, h, s


$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$


if $r = r'$

Quantum Mechanics II



EPR pairs:

prob. $1/2 : 0$ prob. $1/2 : 1$




Proof of Obliviousness: Purification

Alice

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$




$$|x\rangle_r$$



Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

r, h, s



$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$


gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$

Proof of Obliviousness: Purification II

Alice

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^{r0}$$


$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$



Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

r, h, s




gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$

Proof of Obliviousness: EPR-Version

Alice



Bob

store all qubits!



$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$



r, h, s

$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$


memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$


Proof of Obliviousness: Distributions

Alice



Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store < n/2 qubits



r, h, s

$h \in R H_n$


$s = b \oplus h(x)$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$


Proof of Obliviousness: Example

Alice



Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits



r, h, s

$$h \in_R H_n$$


$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$


Proof of Obliviousness: Distributions II

Alice




Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store < n/2 qubits



r, h, s

$h \in_R H_n$




$s = b \oplus h(x)$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$

Proof of Obliviousness: Goal

$$\sum_{x \in R} \text{Pr}[x] \in \mathbb{R} \{+, \times\}$$



001...


However Bob prepares his memory

and the distributions p and q , he cannot guess $h(x)$ in both bases **simultaneously** \Rightarrow **oblivious**


Privacy Amplification

Privacy Amplification against Quantum Adversaries
 [Renner & König, TCC 2005]

X a RV over $\{0, 1\}^n$



memory of $< \frac{n}{2}$ qubits




$h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

guess $h(X)$ given qmemory!

Theorem: If $-\log_2(p_\infty(X)) = H_\infty(X) > \frac{n}{2}$,
 then Bob has only negligible knowledge
 about $h(X)$.

Obliviousness: Uncertainty Relation




$$p(\underline{S}) + \text{negl}(n) \geq q(\underline{S}) = 1 - q(\underline{S})$$

Theorem: $p(\underline{S}) + q(\underline{S}) \geq 1$

Proof of Obliviousness: Finale

$$\mathcal{X} \in_R \{+, \times\}$$



$$p(\mathcal{S}) + q(\mathcal{S}) \geq 1 \quad \mathcal{E} := \{x \in \mathcal{S}\}$$


$$\Rightarrow \Pr[\mathcal{E}] = \frac{1}{2} \{p(\mathcal{S}) + q(\mathcal{S})\} > \frac{1}{2} \quad \square$$

Proof of Obliviousness: Recap

Alice

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}$$

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$|x\rangle_r$$


Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store $\leq n/2$ qubits


$$h \in_R H_n$$
$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$

r, h, s

gets $b = s \oplus h(x)$
if $r = r'$

Proof of Obliviousness: Recap II

Alice



Bob

store all qubits!



memory bound: store $\leq n/2$ qubits

$$\mathcal{X} \in_R \{+, \times\}$$


r, h, s

$$h \in_R H_n$$
$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$
if $r = r'$


Proof of Obliviousness: Recap III

Alice



Bob

store all qubits!



001...

memory bound: store $\leq n/2$ qubits



$$h \in_R H_n$$

$$s = b \oplus h(x)$$




r, h, s

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$

if $r = r'$

Proof of Obliviousness: Recap IV

Alice



Bob

$\mathcal{E} := \{x \in S\}$
 with $\Pr[\mathcal{E}] \geq \frac{1}{2}$ \square



r, h, s

$h \in_R H_n$
 $s = b \oplus h(x)$

gets $b = s \oplus h(x')$
 if $r = r'$

Agenda

- ✓ Known Results
- ✓ Protocol for Oblivious Transfer
- ✓ Security Proof
- **Bit Commitment**
- Practicality Issues
- Open Problems

Quantum Bit Commitment

Verifier

$$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$r \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$$

$$|x_1\rangle_{r_1}, \dots, |x_n\rangle_{r_n}$$


Committer

$$b \in \{+, \times\}$$

obtains x' by
measuring all qubits
in basis b



--- **memory bound: store < n/2 qubits** ---

b, x'



accepts, if $x_i = x'_i$
where $r_i = b$

Quantum Bit Commitment II

Verifier

n qubits



Committer

$b \in \{0, 1\}$

memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

b, x'




BC

- one round
- non-interactive (commit by receiving)
- unconditionally hiding
- unconditionally binding:
 - classically: $\text{Mem}_{\text{dis}} < 2 \cdot \text{Mem}_{\text{hon}}$
 - quantum: $\text{Mem}_{\text{dis}} < n / 2$


Binding Property: Proof Idea

Verifier



Committer

store all qubits!
 $b \in \{+, \times\}$



BC ✓

memory bound: store $< n/2$ qubits

b, x'



accepts, if $x_i = x'_i$
where $r_i = b$

Agenda

- ✓ Known Results
- ✓ Protocol for Oblivious Transfer
- ✓ Security Proof
- ✓ Bit Commitment
- **Practicality Issues**
- Open Problems

Practicality Issues

With today's technology, we

- **can** transmit quantum bits
 - encode bits in the correct basis
 - send them over optical fibers
 - receive and measure them
- **cannot store** them for longer than a few milliseconds

OT

BC

Problems:

- imperfect sources (multi-pulse emissions)
- transmission errors

Practicality Issues II


Our protocols can be modified to

- **resist attacks based on multi-photon emissions**
- **tolerate (quantum) noise**

OT



BC



→ Well within reach of **current technology and unconditionally secure** as long as nobody can store large amounts of quantum bits.

Open Problems and Next Steps

- Other flavors of OT:
e.g. 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer,
String-OT, ...
- Better memory bounds
- Composability? What happens to the
memory bound?
- Better uncertainty relations for more
MUB
- ...

OT



BC



Quantum 1-2-OT

Alice $b_0, b_1 \in \{0, 1\}$

$r \in_R \{+, \times\}^n$

$x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$

$|x_1\rangle_{r_1}, \dots, |x_n\rangle_{r_n}$
●●●●●●●●▲

Bob $c \in \{0, 1\}$

$r' := [+ , \times]_c$

obtains x' by
measuring all qubits
in basis r'

memory bound: store $< 0.4n$ qubits

r, h_0, h_1

$h_0, h_1 \in_R H_{n/2}$

s_0, s_1

$s_0 = b_0 \oplus h_0(x_+)$

$s_1 = b_1 \oplus h_1(x_\times)$

gets $b_c = s_c \oplus h_c(x'_{r'_c})$

Summary

Protocols for OT and BC that are

- efficient
- non-interactive
- **unconditionally secure** against adversaries with bounded quantum memory
- practical:
 - honest players do not need quantum memory
 - fault-tolerant

OT

BC

Questions and Comments?

OT



BC

